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Simone de Beauvoir insisted that she was no philosopher, yet she wrote what is widely regarded as one of the first and most influential tracts 
of feminist prose, The Second Sex, published in 1949 and translated into 
nineteen different languages (Rossi 674). Her philosophy was strongly 
existentialist, especially concerning the concept of human identity. In his 
Existentialism is a Humanism, Jean-Paul Sartre explains that a human being 
is one whose “existence comes before its essence.” In effect, we, as human 
beings, have no necessary or inherent place in the world, and our identity 
emerges through our actions. When looking back on our life, it is what we 
did which determines who we were. We can then ask, what did Simone de 
Beauvoir do? Who was she? And, more importantly, did her actions reflect her 
philosophy? In her literary works, Simone de Beauvoir used existential ideas 
to propose new strategies for people, especially women, to live and function 
in society, and she herself did everything she could to put these ideas into 
practice in her own life.
 In order to explore de Beauvoir’s life in relation to her philosophy, it 
will help first to explain the main ideas of existentialism. Most importantly, 
meaning is based only in human action, and this premise is what distinguishes 
existentialism from much of the Western philosophy that came before it. 
Plato, Descartes, and Kant, for instance, sought to ground human meaning 
and truth in objective reason; indeed, for Kant, freedom means subjecting 
oneself to one’s own reason. Hegel sought to ground meaning and truth in 
Spirit. There is a long tradition in grounding truth and meaning either in 
something outside of human beings (God or Spirit), or in a human capacity 
that is seen as objective and universal (reason). Existentialism argues that there 
is no ultimate ground for human meaning, which is only contingent upon 
human action. Reason does not dictate any particular action, and if there is 
a God or Spirit (which Sartre and de Beauvoir did not believe), we certainly 
don’t know what it is thinking, so we are radically free. For instance, what 
we normally consider to be constraints on our action, such as laws or social 
expectations, are not actually constraints at all; if we follow them, we are 
choosing to do so, even if we tell ourselves that we have to. Even apparently 
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obvious choices, such as choosing not to kill someone, remain choices no 
matter what we tell ourselves.
 One might ask why it’s important that de Beauvoir’s life reflected her 
philosophy, and the answer lies in the ideas of authenticity and inauthenticity, 
which are fundamental to the existential system that she, for the most part, 
adopted. To be authentic is to act and make our choices for ourselves, because 
we want to, not because others want us to. Inauthenticity, on the other hand, 
is to act for the sake of duty; we act a certain way because that is how one is 
supposed to act or how others (even moral people) act (“Existentialism”). The 
character Garcin in Sartre’s No Exit is a perfect example of inauthenticity: He 
claims throughout most of the play to be courageous though he admits later 
on that in a time of crisis, he acted as a coward. His inauthenticity comes 
from his shame of having made a cowardly choice; by professing himself 
as a brave human being rather than claiming his cowardice, he is allowing 
society’s condemnation of cowards to determine his choices. He is not acting 
for himself, but for others. 
 In contrast, throughout her life, Simone de Beauvoir’s actions were not 
governed by what was expected of her. She chose at an early age not to marry, 
and though forbidden to enroll at École Normale Supérieure (ENS) because 
of her sex, she audited classes in order to be properly prepared for the general 
teaching examination, the aggrégation. She was open to sexual encounters, 
spontaneous and long term, with a broad spectrum of both men and women, 
including famous people – such as journalist Jacques Bost, American author 
Nelson Algren, and Claude Lanzmann, creator of the Holocaust documentary 
Shoah – and even her young female students; and she continued to support 
Communism even when most of the Western world disagreed with it. De 
Beauvoir thus challenged numerous social expectations concerning biological 
sex, socially constructed gender roles, sexual behavior and attitudes, and the 
influence of politics and society on all three. 
 The necessity of authenticity to de Beauvoir’s philosophy is reflected in 
her integration of this concept as a requirement for love. In The Second Sex 
she says, “An authentic love should take on the other’s contingence, that is, 
his lacks, limitations and originary gratuitousness; it would not claim to be a 
salvation, but an inter-human relation” (711). She also stated, 
Authentic love must be founded on reciprocal recognition of two 
freedoms; each lover would then experience himself as himself 
and as the other, neither would abdicate his transcendence, they 
would not mutilate themselves; together they would both reveal 
values and ends in the world. For each of them, love would be 
the revelation of self through the gift of self and the enrichment 
of the universe. (723)
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Clearly the relationship that Simone and Jean-Paul shared differed markedly 
from conventional definitions of romantic love. They never lived together, 
both had long-term and serious relationships with other people, and their 
physical relationship seemed of minute or no importance. 
 Simone de Beauvoir, in fact, condemned the traditional concept of love 
and the situation in which women in love find themselves. She parallels the 
situation of the woman in love to that of a woman in a harem:  
The worst horror of woman’s condition in a harem is that her 
days are deserts of boredom: when the male is not using this 
object that she is for him, she is absolutely nothing. The situa-
tion of the woman in love is analogous:  she only wants to be this 
loved woman and nothing else has value in her eyes. For her to 
exist, then, her lover must be by her side, taken care of by her. 
(Second 718) 
In stark contrast, the love that she and Sartre shared grew from an 
understanding that they were both equally dependent on each other, yet also 
independent of each other. They both had affairs with numerous people, 
yet their love endured. Love itself is thus for de Beauvoir not simply given; 
indeed, she argues that society’s notion of love is dangerous, so she transforms 
love itself into an existential concept in order to make it authentic.   
 Closely connected to the concepts of authenticity and inauthenticity is 
bad faith, a state described by existentialists in which we deceive and act in 
a manner untrue to ourselves. In his Essays in Existentialism, Sartre describes 
bad faith as, “Consciousness [which] instead of directing its negation outward 
turns it toward itself” (148). “In bad faith,” he says, “it is from myself that I am 
hiding the truth” (150). In light of this definition, one could (and should) ask 
how de Beauvoir, a staunch feminist, could have a life-long relationship with a 
man who had sexual relationships with innumerable women. Did she just care 
to overlook the discrepancies between his lifestyle and her philosophy? Had 
she convinced herself that he respected these women and saw them as equals? 
If so, it would be a glaring example of someone living in bad faith, hiding the 
truth about Sartre’s true personality from herself, and constantly reassuring 
and convincing herself that he was not misogynistic. However this was not 
the case. “Sartre has never been very interested in the question of women,” 
she acknowledged in a 1979 interview (“Simone” 338). She wasn’t blinded 
by love into believing he agreed with her feminist philosophy; she knew very 
well that he wasn’t concerned with at all the woman’s situation. But because 
she experienced an authentic love with Sartre, taking on his “contingence 
… [his] lacks, limitations, and originary gratuitousness” (Second 711), she 
did not try to reform him or save him from what she saw as his faults; she 
acknowledged and accepted their existence. Surely, she hoped that through 
reading, critiquing, and discussing her work in depth together, he would be 
convinced of her arguments, but regardless of whether Sartre ever agreed 
with her ideas, this intellectual exchange created an “inter-human relation” 
between her and Sartre.   
 If one is to continue to question the compatibility of de Beauvoir’s 
feminism with her relationship with Sartre, it is important to examine 
Sartre’s habits in the context of his and de Beauvoir’s relationship. The 
modern western idea of misogyny is often of men who commit to marriage 
and then have secret affairs, which they either try to cover up or use as an 
excuse for divorce. However, Sartre was never evasive or dishonest with de 
Beauvoir about his affairs; they both discussed their contingent relationships 
openly. Simone agreed to and encouraged this behavior, and even engaged 
in it herself. Similarly, according to some feminists, a man who has sex with 
many women is one who necessarily disrespects women, but de Beauvoir 
was refusing to allow even the established feminist position to determine her 
actions, just as she would not allow culture’s notions of women to determine 
them. If she had modified her behavior in reaction to the criticisms of other 
feminists, she would have been living inauthentically, allowing the opinions 
and prejudices of others to shape her lifestyle. For her, the basis of feminism 
is equality, and in their relationship, she and Sartre were equals, and as long 
as he did not hypocritically demand monogamy from her while pursuing 
other women, they remained equals. She chose her situation with Sartre, and 
as long as she made the choice authentically and not in bad faith, there is 
nothing in her and Sartre’s situation that opposes her feminist platform. 
 Simone de Beauvoir thus embodies in her relationship with Sartre the 
very notion of radical freedom that is at the heart of authenticity, and 
freedom itself is a recurring topic in her work. Their lives are an exploration 
of human freedom in a godless world with no moral absolutes and a loss of 
given or transcendent meaning. In this absurd world, there is no such thing 
as absurd behavior; every action is of equal value. For de Beauvoir and other 
existentialists, freedom is the ability make choices about every aspect of one’s 
life; in fact, according to Sartre, one cannot avoid making choices, and in 
that way, everyone is free (Essays 66). This is an idea that de Beauvoir very 
strongly affirmed, especially with regards to the woman’s situation.  In a 1989 
interview, she stated, 
One is a girl with a certain physical training, and a certain social 
training but starting from that, one can choose to accept it or to 
escape it or to … Well naturally, the choice itself depends upon 
a number of things. But after all, there is still some freedom of 
choice, even in resignation of course. (“Two” 16)
In her own life, Simone de Beauvoir chose to renounce the “physical and 
social training” which her parents and society in general had enforced upon 
her and opted for what was considered at the time a more masculine lifestyle. 
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In choosing never to marry, she lived her belief that marriage deprived a 
woman of a meaningful life and her freedom: 
In marrying, the woman receives a piece of the world as property; 
legal guaranties protect her from man’s caprices; but she becomes 
his vassal … The wife has no other task save the one of maintain-
ing and caring for life in its pure and identical generality; she 
perpetuates the immutable species, she assures the even rhythm of 
the days and the permanence of the home she guards with locked 
doors; she is given no direct grasp on the future, not on the uni-
verse; she goes beyond herself towards the group only through her 
husband as a mouthpiece. (Second 454-55) 
What she knew of marriage she learned from observing the people in her 
life, and her beliefs were perpetuated by other writers of her time. In The 
Second Sex, she refers to Honoré de Balzac’s The Physiology of Marriage in 
which he denounces the idea of marriage as a “simple business deal” and 
recognizes that “the principle of marriage has nothing to do with love” 
(465).  De Beauvoir justifiably believed that “law and customs still confer a 
great authority” on the husband because until 1942 (only seven years before 
The Second Sex was published) French law required a woman’s obedience to 
her husband (455).
 Sartre once proposed marriage to de Beauvoir in an effort to keep them 
together during the war, but she refused him: “I remained a feminist. I did not 
at all want to attach myself to a man by the ties of marriage” (“Two”). Even if 
all other aspects of their relationship had remained the same, to have married 
for the sake of being allowed to live together when she herself never wanted 
to marry would have been inauthentic because she would have been following 
someone else’s rules. 
 De Beauvoir also argued that complete freedom depends on economic 
independence, something she would have lost in marriage. She states, “It is 
through work that woman has been able, to a large extent, to close the gap 
separating her from the male; work alone can guarantee her concrete freedom” 
(Second 737). By refusing to live with Sartre, instead living alone throughout 
her adult life, Simone de Beauvoir ensured her financial independence from 
him. She even claims that financial independence is necessary for the possibility 
of authentic love, where the man “represents an indispensable intermediary of 
herself to herself” in the same way the woman does for the man: “It would only 
be the same for woman,” she says, “if she also existed essentially for-herself; this 
would imply that she possessed an economic independence that she projected 
herself towards her own ends and surpassed herself without any intermediary 
towards the group. Thus equal loves are possible” (Second 724). When she 
refused to marry Sartre, she was asserting this independence. She was able to 
support herself first on her teaching salary and then on her writing. In that sense, 
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she espoused what she proclaimed as true freedom: Financially, she depended 
on no one.1 
 Anyone at all familiar with even a cursory account of Simone de Beauvoir’s 
work and life would note that sexual freedom was just as important to her 
as economic freedom. The presence of additional relationships was natural, 
even necessary, for Simone and Jean-Paul in their long-term relationship. 
“What we have is an essential love,” he explained to Simone, “but it is a good 
idea for us also to experience contingent love affairs” (Appignanesi 36). She 
certainly did allow herself to experience these “contingent love affairs,” those 
relationships which had no specific purpose or meaning, and each time she 
entered into one of these affairs, it was her own decision to take it to a sexual 
level, “If I raised the question, it’s because I wanted to,” she said in one of 
her journals (Hawthorne 58). Her involvement with her students and others 
is yet another indication that she embraced radical freedom: Each choice 
she made was made consciously in the moment without concern for social 
expectation.  
 De Beauvoir recognized, however, that for women sexual freedom was far 
from easy to attain. She notes,  “In France, especially, the free woman and the 
easy woman are stubbornly confused, as the idea of easy implies an absence 
of resistance and control, a lack, a very negation of freedom” (Second 746). 
While the free woman chooses to use and satisfy her sexuality as and when 
she wants (in a manner similar to that of many men), the easy woman is she 
who succumbs to the temptations of others without truly choosing for herself. 
In other words, the free woman is authentic and not acting in bad faith. The 
easy woman, while she may not necessarily be inauthentic, is at least acting in 
bad faith because she either does not choose for herself, or she has convinced 
herself that she is choosing for herself when truly she is not.  
 Perhaps de Beauvoir believed Sartre was actually helping women achieve 
sexual freedom through his sexual promiscuity. This could explain why she 
would often introduce young women to him; she was providing them with 
an opportunity for casual sex. From the beginning they knew (or should 
have known) that it would never develop into a serious relationship because 
of Sartre and de Beauvoir’s commitment to each other, and Sartre was a 
rather small man, making him less physically intimidating or dangerous 
than other men these women could have been taking home. Unfortunately, 
some of these women did become emotionally attached to Sartre, and he 
even had rather long relationships with a few of them. In fact, most of the 
women were hurt by the permanence of his and de Beauvoir’s relationship. 
However, because every person is free to choose, these women, even if 
 1.  One could argue that she in fact relied upon the people who bought her books. However, she 
was as free financially as she could be in France’s capitalist society, which may be why she was 
so drawn to communism – in such an economy, she wouldn’t be dependant on the consumers 
purchasing her work, and she truly would be free.
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hurt, made an informed choice to become involved with Sartre, thereby 
absolving both him and de Beauvoir of the responsibility of any emotional 
injury that resulted from their affairs with him. This posits an interesting 
moral and ethical dilemma: De Beauvoir and Sartre may have had their 
own motivations for the contingent affairs into which they entered, but 
was it logical to assume that the other people with whom they were having 
relationships shared their motivations? While it’s true that we are all radically 
free, we still have to face different conditions, such as power relationships, 
as we pursue our freedom. To assume that women are incapable of entering 
into any type of affair with their eyes open is condescending to them, even 
if social conditions indicate that they may not be able to succeed in keeping 
the relationship strictly physical. 
 Although Simone de Beauvoir places a huge emphasis on the importance 
of freedom, she is sure to clarify that freedom does not justify immoral acts. 
In her Ethics of Ambiguity, she states, “the contingent spontaneity cannot 
be judged in the name of freedom” (41). She explains that, “In the passions 
which we shall call maniacal, to distinguish them from the generous passions, 
freedom does not find its genuine form” (64). Herein lies a striking difference 
between her and Sartre: She is concerned with morality, while he is not. Sartre 
operated on a “just do it” system. There is no God; therefore, there is no moral 
universe. De Beauvoir vehemently disagreed: 
Because man is abandoned on earth, because his acts are defini-
tive absolute engagements, he bears the responsibility which is not 
the work of a strange power, but of himself, where his defeats are 
inscribed, and his victories as well. A God can pardon, efface and 
compensate, but if God does not exist, man’s faults are inexpiable. 
(Ethics 16)
Thus our freedom creates our moral responsibility: Because we have freedom 
of choice, because there is no omnipotent being whom we can blame, we must 
take full responsibility for all of our actions, good and bad. These are the actions, 
which, at the end of our life, define who we were. If we are subjects only of 
our own moral universes, then we have the potential to be completely isolated 
within those individual universes. Authenticity and freedom taken to an extreme 
could mean that each individual is completely isolated. On the other hand, we 
could be radically engaged with the world around us; if we understand that we 
are responsible for all of our actions and their effects, then we might be even 
more attentive to their consequences. In her interviews, Simone de Beauvoir is 
constantly defending this line between isolation and engagement. 
 Inextricably intertwined with her ideas of freedom is Simone de 
Beauvoir’s feminist philosophy, for which she is most famous. One could 
(and some do) spend years discussing and debating just this one facet 
of her life; she herself devotes almost one thousand pages to it in The 
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Second Sex, and it is the subject of almost every interview with her. She 
believes that women’s physical difference from men is the only difference: 
“It comes from playing man’s game to say that the woman is essentially 
different from the man. There exists a biological difference, but this 
difference is not the foundation for the sociological difference” (“Simone” 
343). According to her, there is no biological reason why women should 
be treated differently from or as inferior to men; the biology does not 
justify the differences in status that society has created between men and 
women. Here, again, the principle of freedom plays a huge role: A woman 
can choose to accept her social training as a girl or not. De Beauvoir made 
the choice to overcome the traditional upbringing and education she had 
been given, which she believed was inferior to those of boys her age. In 
a 1985 interview, she said, “I thought that they [the boys at the College 
Stanislas] had a superior education, that’s true. But in the end, I adapted 
to mine because I thought that later on I would be able to go on to higher 
education” (“Two” 16). Rather than accepting boys’ superior education 
as an inevitable limitation on her, she decided to use what resources she 
did have – her natural intellect and intelligence and scanty education – to 
achieve what she wanted to achieve, which was to continue her education 
beyond high school. She continued in this manner throughout her life, 
refusing to allow society’s prejudices to hinder her success. While other 
women had resigned themselves to the idea that because they were women 
they would have to take the aggrégation five or six times before passing, 
Simone de Beauvoir succeeded the first time and received second place 
behind Sartre (it was his second attempt) and at the age of 21 became the 
youngest person ever to pass (“De Beauvoir”). 
 In Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir found, for the first time in her life, someone 
she considered her intellectual equal; she described him as, “the dream 
companion I had longed for since I was fifteen” (Memoirs 2007). The two of 
them always had a strong influence on each other’s work. When questioned 
about this in a 1979 interview, she replied, “I think we have had a reciprocal 
influence, that is, that each of us has criticized the works of the other.” She 
emphasizes the distinction between her own work and Sartre’s by declaring 
that she was “not a philosopher, but a literary writer; Sartre is the philosopher” 
(“Two” 13). When asked about her Ethics of Ambiguity in the context of being 
a philosopher, she responded: 
For me it is not philosophy; it is an essay. For me, a philosopher is 
someone like Spinoza, Hegel, or Sartre; someone who has built a 
great system, and not simply someone who likes philosophy, who 
can teach it, understand it, and who can make use of it in essays. 
A philosopher is somebody who truly builds a philosophical sys-
tem. And that, I did not do. (“Simone” 338)
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In a later interview, she expanded upon and clarified this statement:
While I say that I am not a philosopher in the sense that I’m not 
the creator of a system, I’m still a philosopher in the sense that 
I’ve studied a lot of philosophy, I have a degree in philosophy, I’ve 
taught philosophy, I’m infused with philosophy, and when I put 
philosophy into my books it’s because that’s a way for me to view 
the world. (“Two” 20)
Simone de Beauvoir saw her writing as a way to express her philosophical 
beliefs, but generally in the context of a realistic situation, as in her novels, 
or in relation to her own life, as in her memoirs. In The Ethics of Ambiguity, 
which she refers to as an essay, she takes the existential concept of freedom, 
which had already been developed by philosophers such as Sartre, and she 
explains how morality and every day life are compatible with this idea. Her 
goal is to ground existentialist ethics in “history and concrete relationships 
rather than abstractions” (“Two”). Rather than developing a system, as she 
says true philosophers do, she is taking an aspect of an existing system and 
demonstrating how it is applicable and functional in our society.  
 In The Second Sex, however, she is very much a philosopher, even by her own 
definition. She spends a great deal of time painstakingly laying out principles of 
equality and freedom upon which a system could be built. One could even go 
so far as to say that she builds this system herself. Not only does she explain why 
women are equal to and have the same freedoms as men, but she elaborates on 
these foundations and informs us of how this equality can be attained: “They 
[women] must refuse the limits of their situation and seek to open paths to the 
future; resignation is only a surrender and an evasion; for woman there is no 
other way out than to work for her liberation” (680). She argues that although 
women have the choice to either rise up over their limitations or to accept them, 
these limitations would be greatly reduced if society modified its treatment of 
women and girls, thus making it easier for women to achieve equality with men: 
“Woman is the victim of no mysterious fate; the singularities that make her 
different derive their importance from the meaning applied to them; they can be 
overcome as soon as they are grasped from new perspectives” (779). Much of the 
criticism of de Beauvoir’s feminist philosophy comes from a misunderstanding 
of her true goals for women’s liberation. While it is true that de Beauvoir adopts 
an existentialist point of view in arguing that women need to overcome their 
differences, she uses this as a stepping-stone in a more dramatic proposal to 
change society as a whole and transform the significance of women’s differences. 
Radical freedom is compatible with being socially conditioned. If little girls 
and boys were not, from their infancy, treated unequally and instilled with the 
notions that men are superior to women, it would be easier for women to make 
choices that lead to their freedom. She explains, “When she [a woman] starts her 
adult life, she does not have the same past as a boy; society does not see her with 
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the same eyes; she has a different perspective on the universe. Being a woman 
poses unique problems to an autonomous human being today.” Furthermore, 
“Even the woman who has emancipated herself economically from man is still 
not in a moral, social, or psychological situation identical to his” (739). De 
Beauvoir argues that in order to be in these same “situations” as man and “To 
be a complete individual, equal to man, woman has to have access to the male 
world as man does to the female one, access to the other; but the demands of the 
other are not symmetrical in the two cases” (741). De Beauvoir’s goal is not for 
each woman to rise up and overcome her challenges on her own but for women 
as a whole to create a new social order; truly she is calling for a Hegelian and 
Marxist cause of change – a crushing of the current system and creating a new 
paradigm in which women are subjects rather than simply objects.
 De Beauvoir was very sure of her independence from Sartre; it is clear that 
it was extremely important to her that she be the feminist she promoted in The 
Second Sex because if she were not, she would be living an inauthentic life. She 
defended her long-term relationship with him against those who accused it of 
being anti-feminist: “We were very, very close. But that’s nothing contrary to 
feminism. Because I believe that one can be close to a man and be a feminist” 
(“Two” 24). She explains, “My independence has never been in danger because 
I have never unloaded any of my own responsibilities on Sartre” (Force 77). 
She also asserted that she never once sacrificed herself for him; she described 
herself as “completely adverse, the enemy of that idea,” and declared, “I never 
had the idea of sacrificing myself. … I never sacrificed myself for Sartre, any 
more than he sacrificed for me” (“Two” 23). Although neither of them made 
any sacrifices in their relationship, they were not necessarily selfish; she says in 
Force of Circumstance: “He has helped me as I have helped him” (77). These 
two statements reveal what is most important to her, the ideas of reciprocity and 
equality. Neither she nor Sartre gave up what they took to be most important: 
their ideals and their commitment to each other. This preservation of personal 
ideals is extremely important, especially for a woman, who at that time, was 
expected to abandon any goals she may have had upon marriage. Although not 
married, it was essential to Simone de Beauvoir that, in her relationship with 
Sartre, she did not have to give up anything that was important to her.
 It is important to note that helping someone, or doing something for 
another person is an authentic act as long as the motivation behind the act of 
helping comes from one’s own desire to give aid. Perhaps one point is that we 
are always already in relationships with others, so the real question becomes 
not whether we should help or sacrifice for others but instead how we can 
preserve our freedom and equality within these relationships, a question that 
de Beauvoir answers quite well:
To emancipate woman is to refuse to enclose her in the relations 
she sustains with man, but not to deny them … each will remain 
an other for the other; reciprocity in their relations will not do 
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away with the miracles that the division of human beings into two 
separate categories engenders:  desire, possession, love, dreams, 
adventure; and the words that move us:  to give to conquer, and 
to unite will keep their meaning; on the contrary, it is when the 
slavery of half of humanity is abolished and with it the whole 
hypocritical system it implies that the division of humanity will 
reveal its authentic meaning and the human couple will discover 
its true form. (Second 782)
Through the philosophical system that she develops in The Second Sex, Simone 
de Beauvoir instructs society on how to help women become independent. 
This independence, however, is not to be equated with isolation, as many 
people who accuse de Beauvoir of being hypocritical make the mistake of 
doing. Upon closer examination of her work, readers will learn that she does 
not denounce relationships between men and women as such; instead, she 
condemns those relationships in which there is no reciprocity, in which one 
party dominates the other.  
 In this sense, Simone de Beauvoir truly embodied her own philosophy. 
Though at first glance, her relationship with Sartre may seem anti-feminist 
and contradictory to her values and principles, it truly was a reciprocal 
relationship; they had an intellectual and emotional understanding that may 
be difficult to explain, but can best be understood with a knowledge of de 
Beauvoir’s philosophy of authentic love. She wasn’t living inauthentically or in 
bad faith by convincing herself that Sartre was someone he wasn’t. What they 
had in their relationship was equality, reciprocity, and freedom, the principles 
which de Beauvoir valued above all else. She maintained her independence and 
lived for herself, not allowing society’s standards to lead her into authenticity 
or bad faith. If she had convinced herself of being or not being a certain kind 
of person, it was only with regards to her idea that she was no philosopher; 
though creating a philosophical system may not have been her sole objective, 
she certainly created one in The Second Sex, providing women and society 
as a whole with the means to allow equality between men and women. This 
does not necessarily mean she was living in bad faith; what she accomplished 
is more important than what she called it. What’s significant are the goals 
she was aiming for – equality, reciprocity, writing, thinking – and in refusing 
to call herself a philosopher, she was defining her own identity in relation to 
Sartre. One could argue that to try to stake out an identity in distinction to 
Sartre is bad faith; some have even gone as far as to claim that she felt inferior 
to him, which is why she refused the title of philosopher. However, it is not 
necessary for her to have felt inferior to him in order to want to distinguish 
herself from him, precisely for good reasons of authenticity: She is not Sartre. 
Authenticity is not simply about isolated action, it is about taking up one’s 
action with others in a way that is true to oneself, and she clearly did just that. 
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